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BRIEF OF AMICI CURIAE ENVIRONMENTAL 
LAW PROFESSORS IN SUPPORT OF 
FEDERAL RESPONDENTS AND 
INTERVENOR-RESPONDENTS 
 The undersigned environmental law professors 
respectfully submit this brief as amici curiae in 
support of Federal Respondents and Intervenor-
Respondents.1 
INTERESTS OF THE AMICI CURIAE 
 
Amici curiae are twenty-six professors of law 
who research, teach, and write about environmental 
law, natural resources law, property law, and 
administrative law.  Amici have particular expertise 
regarding the history, purpose, procedures, and 
application of the substantive standards of the 
Endangered Species Act (ESA), the nation’s premier 
wildlife conservation law.  This case concerns a 
question of first impression that goes to the heart of 
the conservation provisions of the ESA, namely 
whether the law protects the historic but currently 
unoccupied habitat of an endangered species (the 
dusky gopher frog) that has been determined by the 
                                                 
1 Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 37.6, amici curiae state that 
no counsel for a party authored this brief in whole or in part, and 
no person or entity other than amici curiae or their counsel made 
a monetary contribution to the preparation or submission of this 
brief.  Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 37.3, all appropriate 
parties have filed letters granting blanket consent to the filing 
of amici curiae briefs. 
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Secretary of the Interior, based on the best scientific 
data available, to be “essential for the conservation” 
of the species.  The answer to this question could have 
profound consequences for a growing list of imperiled 
species whose historic habitat has been greatly 
reduced and degraded by the appropriation of land 
and natural resources to serve human needs. 
    
Amici wish to provide the Court with their 
independent views on how this important provision of 
the ESA should be interpreted and what role the 
courts should play in reviewing the exercise of the 
discretionary authority that Congress granted to the 
Secretary.  A list of the amici and their school 
affiliations is provided in the Appendix. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 
 The International Union for the Conservation 
of Nature ranks the dusky gopher frog (Rana sevosa) 
among the top 100 most threatened species in the 
world.  Live Science Staff, 100 Most Threatened 
Species, Live Science (Sept. 11, 2012, 9:56 AM), 
https://www.livescience.com/31743-100-most-
threatened-species.html.  This critically endangered 
amphibian was found historically across parts of 
southwest Alabama, southern Mississippi, and 
southeast Louisiana.  Final Rule To List the 
Mississippi Gopher Frog Distinct Population Segment 
of Dusky Gopher Frog as Endangered, 66 Fed. Reg. 
62,993, 62,994 (Dec. 4, 2001) (to be codified at 50 
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C.F.R. pt. 17).2  But the current total population of 
dusky gopher frogs in the wild is less than 100 
individuals living in three fragmented locations in 
Mississippi.  Pet. App. 108a n.28; Dusky Gopher Frog 
Recovery Team & Mississippi Field Office U.S. Fish & 
Wildlife Service, Dusky Gopher Frog (Rana sevosa) 
Recovery Plan (July 23, 2015), at iv [hereinafter 
“Recovery Plan”].  Habitat loss and degradation 
threaten the survival and recovery of the dusky 
gopher frog.  Recovery Plan, supra, at iv.  Less than 
three percent of the old-growth longleaf pine-savanna 
upon which the dusky gopher frog and other endemic 
species depend remains.  Lewis Thomas, Restoring a 
Disappearing Ecosystem: the Longleaf Pine Savanna, 
U.S. Dep’t of Agric. Forest Serv. (2013).  Thus, as the 
record demonstrates, recovery of the dusky gopher 
frog will not be possible “without the establishment of 
additional breeding populations.”  Final Designation 
of Critical Habitat for Dusky Gopher Frog (Previously 
Mississippi Gopher Frog), 77 Fed. Reg. 35,117, 35,124 
(June 12, 2012) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17) 
[hereinafter “Final Designation”]. 
 
                                                 
2 At the time of listing, the species was known as the Mississippi 
gopher frog (Rana capito sevosa), a distinct population segment 
of the dusky gopher frog (Rana capito).  Final Designation of 
Critical Habitat for Dusky Gopher Frog (Previously Mississippi 
Gopher Frog), 77 Fed. Reg. 35,117, 35,118 (June 12, 2012) (to be 
codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17).  The species has since been 
recognized as its own species by the herpetological scientific 
community, and its scientific name has been changed to Rana 
sevosa.  Id. 
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To comply with its obligations under the ESA 
to promote the recovery of dusky gopher frogs, the 
U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) initially 
proposed designating eleven units of critical habitat 
for the species in Mississippi.  Proposed Designation 
of Critical Habitat for Mississippi Gopher Frog, 75 
Fed. Reg. 31,387 (June 3, 2010) (to be codified at 50 
C.F.R. pt. 17).  Pursuant to its statutory duty to use 
the “best scientific data available,” 16 U.S.C. 
§ 1533(b)(2), and as required by its peer review policy, 
FWS submitted the proposed critical habitat 
designation to relevant outside scientific experts for 
their evaluation.  Notice of Interagency Cooperative 
Policy for Peer Review in Endangered Species Act 
Activities, 59 Fed. Reg. 34,270 (July 1, 1994); Final 
Designation, 77 Fed. Reg. at 35,119.  These 
independent experts deemed the proposed 
designation insufficient for the conservation of the 
dusky gopher frog, stating that “additional habitat 
should be considered throughout the historic range of 
the species.”  Final Designation, 77 Fed. Reg. at 
35,119.  Specifically, they recommended including 
habitat in Louisiana to support the continued 
existence and recovery of the frog.  Id.  Consistent 
with the best scientific data available, FWS expanded 
its critical habitat designation to include historic, but 
currently unoccupied habitat outside of Mississippi in 
St. Tammany Parish, Louisiana.  Id. at 35,124. 
 
FWS determined that the five ephemeral ponds 
located on the St. Tammany Parish tract (Unit 1) 
provide “breeding habitat that in its totality is not 
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known to be present elsewhere within the historic 
range of the dusky gopher frog.”  Id.  According to 
scientific experts, Unit 1’s landscape structure of 
multiple breeding ponds interconnected by forested 
upland habitat mimics the natural, historic landscape 
of dusky gopher frogs that is capable of supporting a 
viable population.  See Recovery Plan, supra, at 13.  
The Secretary further determined that maintaining 
the five seasonally flooded ponds within this area as 
suitable habitat into which dusky gopher frogs could 
be translocated is “essential to decrease the risk of 
extinction of the species resulting from [wildfire, 
disease, and other] stochastic events and provide for 
the species’ eventual recovery.”  Final Designation, 77 
Fed. Reg. at 35,133.  Unit 1 also serves as a refuge for 
the frog from “environmental threats or catastrophic 
events,” including climate change, which will 
“undoubtedly affect [frogs] in the coming decades.”3  
Id. at 35,124. 
 
Unit 1 consists of a complex of five ephemeral 
ponds and their associated uplands, which as late as 
1965 hosted at least two breeding sites for the last 
known population of the dusky gopher frog outside 
                                                 
3 Amphibians are among the species most at risk from climate 
change because they are susceptible to desiccation, or drying out.  
Final Designation, 77 Fed. Reg. at 35,124.  Climate change may 
impact the amount or frequency of precipitation, causing 
irregular and drier conditions.  Id.  This is particularly 
significant for the dusky gopher frog, which relies on seasonally 
flooded ponds sourced by heavy winter rain events for breeding.  
Id. at 35,131. 
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Mississippi.  Id. at 35,315.  Ephemeral ponds suitable 
for dusky gopher frog breeding cannot be replicated.  
Id. at 35,123.  Although artificial, man-made ponds 
have been successfully used for breeding other gopher 
frog species, dusky gopher frogs require ponds with 
more specific features for breeding, namely “grassy, 
acidic, isolated, ephemeral, depressional wetlands” 
(or seasonal ponds) lacking predaceous fish.  Id. at 
35,123; Recovery Plan, supra, at iv.  Ponds must “hold 
water long enough to allow for tadpole development 
and metamorphosis, but if they hold water too long 
they become permanent ponds and no longer have 
value for [dusky gopher frogs].”  Final Designation, 77 
Fed. Reg. at 35,123.  Despite FWS’s ongoing efforts for 
over a decade at the DeSoto National Forest, it has 
not established a successful breeding site due to the 
challenges of creating a functional ephemeral wetland 
(or seasonal pond) in the landscape.  Id.  Re-creating 
elsewhere a site similar to Unit 1 that contains not 
one, but five functional, suitable (and rare) ephemeral 
breeding ponds in a natural landscape within a 
timeframe that would “provide near-term 
conservation benefits to the dusky gopher frog” is 
extremely unlikely, if not impossible.  Id.  
 
In addition, the surrounding marginally 
suitable upland habitat of Unit 1 can be successfully 
restored “with reasonable effort” to provide 
nonbreeding habitat for dusky gopher frogs.  Id. at 
35,135.  FWS has identified a number of voluntary 
conservation incentives for private landowners to 
achieve habitat restoration in Unit 1, such as habitat 
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conservation plans that incorporate the landowners’ 
timber management goals and private landowner 
funding for habitat management through the U.S. 
Department of Agriculture’s Healthy Forests 
Initiative.  Id.   
 
Based on the best scientific data available, the 
Secretary determined that the presence of ephemeral 
ponds is essential to the recovery of the species 
because of “the low number of remaining populations 
and severely restricted range of the [frogs]” and the 
restorable nature of the nonbreeding habitat.  Id. at 
35,133.  By providing breeding habitat capable of 
supporting multiple local populations of the frog at a 
geographically distant location from living 
populations, Unit 1 increases the frog’s resiliency to 
extinction and its ability to recover, which the 
Secretary has determined is “essential for the 
conservation of the [species].”  Id. at 35,130. 
 
As the Secretary recognized, designation of 
unoccupied habitat, even though it may not be 
currently suitable, will become increasingly 
important to the survival of the growing list of species 
vulnerable to climate change.  Id. at 35,124. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
 
The Fifth Circuit correctly upheld the 
Secretary’s designation of the St. Tammany Parish 
tract (Unit 1) as critical habitat for the dusky gopher 
frog.  To advance the ESA’s goals of species survival 
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and recovery, Congress explicitly gave the Secretary 
broad discretion to designate as critical habitat areas 
that are unoccupied where the Secretary determines 
“that such areas are essential for the conservation” of 
the species.  16 U.S.C. § 1532(5)(A)(ii).  The question 
whether designation of such habitat has the 
potential to serve the recovery goals for a particular 
species is a matter within the sound expertise of the 
Secretary.  
 
Here, the Secretary reasonably interpreted the 
ESA when he found that Unit 1—an area that the frog 
previously occupied and that continues to contain 
rare ephemeral ponds suitable for the frog’s breeding 
habitat—is “essential for the conservation” of the 
species.  Accordingly, and based on the unanimous 
recommendation of the scientific peer review panel, 
the Secretary properly designated the area as critical 
habitat.  The text, structure, purpose, and legislative 
history of the ESA support the Secretary’s 
interpretation and critical habitat designation.  
 
Contrary to Petitioner’s argument and the 
views of the dissent below, the plain text of the ESA 
does not include a “habitability” requirement.  
Rather, Congress made a conscious decision to 
differentiate between occupied and unoccupied 
habitat, making it clear that unoccupied habitat need 
not contain all of the “physical or biological features” 
required for immediate occupancy.  See id. 
§ 1532(5)(A)(i), (ii). 
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The structure of the Act, along with its broad 
remedial purpose of species recovery, supports the 
Secretary’s interpretation of “essential for the 
conservation” of the species.  The ESA defines 
“conservation” as “the use of all methods and 
procedures which are necessary to bring any 
endangered species . . . to the point at which the 
measures provided pursuant to [the Act] are no longer 
necessary.”  Id. § 1532(3).  Another provision requires 
the Secretary to develop and implement recovery 
plans “for the conservation and survival of 
endangered species.”  Id. § 1533(f)(1).  These 
provisions—read together against the backdrop of a 
statutory scheme aimed at species recovery—support 
the interpretation that the Secretary may designate 
unoccupied habitat as critical habitat even if, as here, 
it has been altered by human activities and requires 
substantial restoration in order to fully meet the 
physical and biological needs of the species.  Because 
the land at issue in this case offers the only viable 
option for species recovery, prohibiting the Secretary 
from designating that land would be contrary to the 
Act’s structure and purpose.  
 
The legislative history confirms the 
reasonableness of the Secretary’s interpretation and 
contradicts Petitioner’s reading.  In the 1978 
amendments to the Act, Congress explicitly rejected 
language that would have imposed temporal and 
habitability requirements on the designation of 
unoccupied habitat.  This history further confirms 
that Congress intended to give the Secretary broad 
10 
 
 
 
authority to designate unoccupied critical habitat 
that might require the reintroduction of species 
unable to reach it on their own.   
 
Contrary to Petitioner’s suggestion, the 
interpretation of the ESA that amici support would 
not grant carte blanche authority to the Secretary to 
designate anything and everything as critical habitat.  
The presence of a rare, virtually impossible to 
reproduce complex of breeding ponds—the last 
remaining within the historic range of the frog outside 
of Mississippi—is what renders the protection of Unit 
1 “essential for the conservation” of the frog and 
justifies the Secretary’s critical habitat designation.   
 
The Fifth Circuit also correctly declined to 
review the Secretary’s decision not to exercise his 
discretion to exclude an area from critical habitat 
designation.  The text of section 4(b)(2) limits the 
Secretary’s discretion to exclude an area from 
designation in certain circumstances (i.e. where the 
benefits of exclusion do not outweigh the benefits of 
inclusion or where extinction would result from 
exclusion).  A decision to exclude—which is equivalent 
to a decision not to designate critical habitat—is, 
therefore, properly reviewable. 
   
However, the statute is silent with respect to 
decisions not to exclude.  Section 4(b)(2) contains no 
“judicially manageable standards” limiting the 
Secretary’s exercise of discretionary authority not to 
exclude.  Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 830 (1985).  
11 
 
 
 
Thus, a decision by the Secretary not to exclude an 
area from designation is unreviewable because it is 
“committed to agency discretion by law.”  5 U.S.C. 
§ 701(a)(2).  
ARGUMENT 
 
I. The Secretary’s Determination That 
Protection of Unit 1 Is “Essential for 
the Conservation” of the Dusky 
Gopher Frog Is Entitled to Deference 
Because It Is Supported by the Best 
Scientific Data Available as well as 
the Text, Structure, Purpose, and 
Legislative History of the Endangered 
Species Act. 
The question presented is whether the 
Secretary exceeded the scope of his statutory 
authority in designating Unit 1 as critical habitat 
even though it currently lacks some of the physical 
and biological features required to fully support the 
gopher frog.  The question ultimately turns on the 
meaning of the phrase “essential for the conservation 
of the species.”  Congress has not spoken directly to 
the precise question at issue, namely whether 
unoccupied habitat must be immediately “habitable” 
in order to be declared “essential for the conservation” 
of the dusky gopher frog.  Nevertheless, it is clear 
from the text, structure, purpose, and history of the 
ESA, as well as the comprehensive administrative 
record developed in this case, that the Secretary 
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properly exercised the broad discretion Congress gave 
him to use “all methods and procedures which are 
necessary to bring any endangered species or 
threatened species to the point at which the measures 
provided pursuant to this chapter are no longer 
necessary.”  16 U.S.C. § 1532(3).       
 
Where a statute “is silent or ambiguous” with 
respect to a specific term, an agency’s reasonable 
interpretation of that term is entitled to substantial 
deference.  Chevron v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 
467 U.S. 837, 843–44 (1984) (observing that Court has 
“long recognized that considerable weight should be 
accorded to an executive department’s construction of 
a statutory scheme it is entrusted to administer”).  
When Congress enacted the ESA, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531–
44, it “delegated broad administrative and 
interpretive power to the Secretary,” as necessary to 
execute the complex policy decisions required under 
the Act.  Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for 
a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687, 708 (1995) (noting that 
Congress gave Secretary “latitude . . . in enforcing the 
statute”).  Where Congress has “entrusted the 
Secretary with broad discretion,” the Court is 
“especially reluctant to substitute [its] views” for 
those of the Secretary.  Id.  Importantly, the ESA need 
not “compel[] the Secretary’s interpretation”; it is 
sufficient that the interpretation is reasonable and 
that “Congress did not unambiguously manifest its 
intent to adopt” an opposing view.  Id. at 703. 
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In section 4 of the ESA, Congress directed the 
Secretary, “to the maximum extent prudent and 
determinable,” to designate critical habitat to protect 
and recover imperiled species.  16 U.S.C. 
§ 1533(a)(3)(A).  Habitat loss and degradation are the 
leading causes of species endangerment in North 
America, and threats to habitat affect more than 85% 
of listed species under the ESA.  Amy N. Hagen & 
Karen E. Hodges, Resolving Critical Habitat 
Designation Failures: Reconciling Law, Policy, and 
Biology, 20 Conservation Biology 399, 400 (2006).  
Congress highlighted the importance of habitat 
conservation in the ESA’s stated purpose: “to provide 
a means whereby the ecosystems upon which 
endangered species and threatened species depend 
may be conserved [and] to provide a program for the 
conservation of such [species].”  16 U.S.C. § 1531(b).  
Congress further defined “conservation” as “the use of 
all methods and procedures” necessary to recover 
listed species, including habitat acquisition and 
maintenance.  Id. § 1532(3) (emphasis added).  To 
advance the Act’s species survival and recovery goals, 
Congress entrusted the Secretary with broad 
discretion to designate as critical habitat both 
occupied and unoccupied areas that the Secretary 
determines are “essential for the conservation of the 
species.”  Id. § 1532(5)(A)(i), (ii).   
 
In this case, the Secretary reasonably 
concluded that unoccupied habitat includes areas 
where the endangered species does not currently live, 
but which could be acquired or improved to provide 
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for the species’ biological and physical needs.  Indeed, 
the Secretary’s decision was driven in large part by 
the unanimous recommendation of the scientific peer 
review panel that designation of critical habitat 
outside Mississippi was absolutely essential to 
recovery of the species.  Under these circumstances, 
the Secretary’s determination was eminently 
reasonable and consistent with the ESA’s species 
recovery goals.  Cf. Sweet Home, 515 U.S. at 708 
(explaining that judicial deference is particularly apt 
where Secretary’s interpretation is supported by “the 
text, structure, and legislative history of the ESA”).  
As in Sweet Home, and with even stronger factual 
support in this case, the text of the ESA as well as its 
structure, purpose, and legislative history 
demonstrate that the Secretary’s interpretation was 
reasonable.  Id. at 697.  
 
A. The text of the ESA indicates that Congress 
consciously chose to authorize the Secretary to 
designate unoccupied habitat that is essential 
to the conservation of the species even though 
it may lack all of the “physical or biological 
features” required for immediate occupancy. 
 
“When Congress includes particular language 
in one section of a statute but omits it in another 
section of the same Act, it is generally presumed that 
Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the 
disparate inclusion or exclusion.”  Allison Engine Co. 
v. United States ex rel. Sanders, 553 U.S. 662, 671 
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(2008) (quoting Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., 534 
U.S. 438, 452 (2002)); see, e.g., Dep’t of Treasury, IRS 
v. Fed. Labor Relations Auth., 494 U.S. 922, 932 
(1990) (“A statute that in one section refers to ‘law, 
rule or regulation,’ and in another section to only 
‘laws’ cannot, unless we abandon all pretense at 
precise communication, be deemed to mean the same 
thing in both places.”).  This is particularly true where 
Congress has included limiting language in one 
provision but not in another adjacent or nearby 
provision in the same statutory section.  See United 
States v. Gonzales, 520 U.S. 1, 5 (1990) (finding it 
“significant” that Congress explicitly limited scope of 
“any crime” to only federal crimes but placed no 
similar limiting language on “any other term of 
imprisonment,” which appears only two sentences 
later in statute); Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. MacLean, 
135 S. Ct. 913, 919 (2015) (observing that “[t]he 
interpretive canon that Congress acts intentionally 
when it omits language included elsewhere applies 
with particular force” where relevant statutory 
provisions are “in close proximity”); Jama v. 
Immigration & Customs Enforcement, 543 U.S. 335, 
341–42 (2005) (“We do not lightly assume that 
Congress has omitted from its adopted text 
requirements that it nonetheless intends to apply, 
and our reluctance is even greater when Congress has 
shown elsewhere in the same statute that it knows 
how to make such a requirement manifest.”). 
 
When Congress amended the ESA in 1978 to 
define “critical habitat,” it included two distinct 
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statutory provisions, one for occupied habitat and one 
for unoccupied habitat: 
 
(i) the specific areas within the 
geographical area occupied by the species, 
at the time it is listed in accordance with 
the provisions of section 1533 of this title, 
on which are found those physical or 
biological features (I) essential to the 
conservation of the species and (II) which 
may require special management 
considerations or protection; and 
(ii) specific areas outside the geographical 
area occupied by the species at the time it 
is listed in accordance with the provisions 
of section 1533 of this title, upon a 
determination by the Secretary that such 
areas are essential for the conservation of 
the species. 
16 U.S.C. § 1532(5)(A).  Subsection (i) authorizes the 
Secretary to designate areas “within the geographical 
area occupied by the species,” if those areas contain 
the “physical or biological features . . . essential to the 
conservation of the species.”  Id. § 1532(5)(A)(i) 
(emphasis added).  Subsection (ii), on the other hand, 
authorizes the Secretary to designate areas “outside 
the geographical area occupied by the species,” if he 
determines those areas are “essential for the 
conservation of the species.”  Id. § 1532(5)(A)(ii).  
While the designated areas for both types of critical 
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habitat must be “essential for the conservation of the 
species,” Congress included the limiting terms 
“physical or biological features” only in subsection (i).  
 
 Congress acted “intentionally and purposely” 
by including the terms “physical or biological 
features” in subsection (i) and omitting them from 
subsection (ii), two statutory provisions that are 
closely related in subject matter and proximity.  
Allison Engine Co., 553 U.S. at 671 (quoting 
Barnhart, 534 U.S. at 452); MacLean, 135 S. Ct. at 
919.  The text, therefore, signals Congress’ intent to 
limit the Secretary’s authority to designate occupied 
critical habitat to areas with physical or biological 
features that are “essential to the conservation of the 
species,” but not the Secretary’s authority to 
designate unoccupied critical habitat.  In doing so, 
Congress must have understood that there would be 
situations where the Secretary would need to 
designate unoccupied critical habitat that might not 
contain all the required “physical or biological 
features” at the time of designation. 
 
 Petitioner erroneously reads section 3(5)(A)(ii) 
to state that Unit 1 must, at present or in the 
foreseeable future, contain all the physical or 
biological features necessary for occupancy by the 
dusky gopher frog.  See Pet. Brief at 27.  This reading 
would require the Court to ignore the text of the 
statute and Congress’ clear intent to omit this 
requirement for unoccupied critical habitat 
designations.  See Dean v. United States, 556 U.S. 
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568, 572 (2009) (explaining that courts “ordinarily 
resist reading words or elements into a statute that 
do not appear on its face” (quotation omitted)). 
 
B. The structure of the ESA shows that Congress 
intended that critical habitat designations be 
used to conserve areas that are currently 
unoccupied but essential to achieve species 
recovery. 
 
 “It is a fundamental canon of statutory 
construction that the words of a statute must be read 
in their context and with a view to their place in the 
overall statutory scheme.”  Food & Drug Admin. v. 
Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 
133 (2000) (citation omitted); see also U. S. Ass’n of 
Texas v. Timber of Inwood Forest Assocs., 484 U.S. 
365, 371 (1988) (“A provision that may seem 
ambiguous in isolation is often clarified by the 
remainder of the statutory scheme . . . because only 
one of the permissible meanings produces a 
substantive effect that is compatible with the rest of 
the law.”).  The term “essential” is part of the phrase 
“essential for the conservation of the species,” as well 
as the larger statutory scheme aimed at species 
recovery, and the term must be read in that context. 
 
The statute expressly defines the term 
“conservation” as “the use of all methods and 
procedures which are necessary to bring any 
endangered species or threatened species to the point 
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at which the measures provided pursuant to [the Act] 
are no longer necessary.”  16 U.S.C. § 1532(3).  FWS 
regulations similarly define “recovery” as the 
“improvement in the status of listed species to the 
point at which listing is no longer appropriate 
under . . . the Act.”  50 C.F.R. § 402.02.  Thus, the 
phrase “essential for the conservation of the species” 
in section 3(5)(A)(ii) authorizes the Secretary to 
designate as critical habitat areas that are necessary 
to achieve species recovery.  A reading of section 
3(5)(A)(ii) requiring that unoccupied critical habitat 
be presently habitable would unreasonably constrain 
the Secretary’s authority to use “all methods 
necessary” to achieve species recovery and frustrate 
Congress’ goals in enacting the ESA.  
 
The objectives of the ESA are two-fold: species 
survival and species recovery.  See Gifford Pinchot 
Task Force v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 378 F.3d 
1059, 1070 (9th Cir. 2004) (“Congress intended that 
conservation and survival be two different (though 
complementary) goals of the ESA.”); Sierra Club v. 
U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 245 F.3d 434, 438 (5th Cir. 
2001) (“[T]he objective of the ESA is to enable listed 
species not merely to survive, but to recover from 
their endangered or threatened status.”).  Listing a 
species as endangered or threatened is the critical 
first step in preventing the extinction of the species; 
indeed, 98% of listed species survive.  FWS, Defining 
Success Under the Endangered Species Act, 
Endangered Species Bulletin (July 12, 2013), 
https://www.fws.gov/endangered/news/episodes/bu-
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04-2013/coverstory/index.html.  Critical habitat 
designation, however, is the chief mechanism to 
achieve recovery of imperiled species.  Gifford Pinchot, 
378 F.3d at 1070.  Species recovery requires future 
expansion into new territory to support a larger, 
recovered population, thereby necessitating the 
designation of geographically distant or presently 
unsuitable lands as critical habitat.  Michael J. Bean, 
The Endangered Species Act: Science, Policy, and 
Politics, 1162 Ann. N.Y. Acad. Sci. 369, 378 (2009).  
Because Congress authorized the Secretary to “use all 
methods and procedures which are necessary” to 
recover a species—not “merely to forestall extinction” 
of the species, Gifford Pinchot, 378 F.3d at 1070—the 
Secretary may designate unoccupied land as critical 
habitat even if it is not, at present, actively 
supporting the species. 
 
 The ESA’s recovery objective is further carried 
out by the requirement that the Secretary develop 
and implement recovery plans “for the conservation 
and survival of endangered and threatened species.”  
16 U.S.C. § 1533(f)(1).  The Act requires that the 
Secretary incorporate into each recovery plan “site-
specific management actions as may be necessary to 
achieve the plan’s goal for the conservation and 
survival of the species” and “objective, measureable 
criteria which, when met, would result in a 
determination . . . that the species be removed from 
the list.”  Id. § 1533(f)(1)(B)(ii).  This section 
reinforces the ultimate purpose of the statute: to 
achieve species recovery through the use of 
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conservation measures, including habitat restoration.  
Recovery plans implemented by FWS, including the 
approved recovery plan for the dusky gopher frog, 
frequently include habitat restoration of unoccupied, 
degraded habitat as a key component of achieving 
species recovery via increasing habitat availability for 
listed species. 4   Without the ability to consider 
marginally suitable and currently unsuitable land 
areas as needed for species recovery, recovery plans 
could not achieve their purpose of species 
conservation.  Similarly, the Secretary has 
reasonably interpreted “essential” unoccupied critical 
habitat to include potentially suitable areas to 
achieve species recovery via conservation measures, 
such as habitat acquisition and maintenance.   
 
If suitable habitat conditions were available to 
the dusky gopher frog, the species’ population would 
not have diminished to fewer than 100 individuals.  
Pet. App. 108a n.28.  Where, as here, “the biggest 
threat to critically endangered species is the 
destruction of habitat, . . . it does not make sense to 
hamstring [the Secretary’s] efforts to conserve the 
                                                 
4  See, e.g., Recovery Plan, supra; FWS, Devils River Minnow 
(Dionda diaboli) Recovery Plan (Aug. 10, 2005); Kathryn 
Kennedy & Jackie Poole, Chisos Mountain Hedgehog Cactus 
(Echinocereus chisoensis var. chisoensis) Recovery Plan (Dec. 8, 
1993); FWS, Recovery Plan for the Alabama Beach Mouse 
(Peromyscus polionotus ammobates), Perido Key Beach Mouse (P. 
p. trisslylepsis), and Choctawhatchee Beach Mouse (P. p. 
allpphrys) (Aug. 12, 1987); FWS, Coachella Valley Fringe-Toed 
Lizard (Uma inornata) Recovery Plan (Sept. 11, 1985). 
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species by limiting the designation of habitat to only 
those areas that contain optimal conditions for the 
species.”  Id. (quoting FWS).  Unoccupied, marginally 
suitable or unsuitable habitat that can be made 
suitable plays a key role in recovering imperiled 
species when optimal habitat areas do not exist 
because in order to recover, species must be able to 
expand into new habitat areas.  Bean, supra, at 378.  
Recognizing this, the ESA authorizes the Secretary to 
consider suboptimal areas that can be restored to 
provide vital additional habitat when the Secretary 
determines that such habitat is essential for the 
conservation of the species.5 
 
C. The broad remedial purpose of the ESA 
supports the Secretary’s interpretation of 
“essential for the conservation of the species.” 
 
Congress enacted the ESA “to provide a means 
whereby the ecosystems upon which endangered 
species and threatened species depend may be 
conserved.”  16 U.S.C. § 1531(b).  The Act further 
directs agencies “to use all methods and procedures 
which are necessary” to preserve endangered species.  
                                                 
5 See FWS, Final Designation of Critical Habitat for the Perdido 
Key Beach Mouse, Choctawhatchee Beach Mouse, and St. 
Andrew Beach Mouse, 71 Fed. Reg. 60,238, 60,253–54 (Oct. 12, 
2006) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17) (finding unoccupied 
habitat essential to the conservation of the species even though 
the habitat did not currently contain all physical or biological 
features for the species’ needs and designating such restorable 
unoccupied habitat as critical). 
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Id. § 1532(3).  This Court has examined the text, 
structure, purpose, and history of the Act to conclude 
that “[t]he plain intent of Congress in enacting this 
statute was to halt and reverse the trend toward 
species extinction.”  Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 
U.S. 153, 184 (1978).  The Court noted that “the 
institutionalization of caution lies at the heart” of the 
statute.  Id. at 153.  This goal of species recovery, 
observed the Court, “is reflected not only in the stated 
policies of the Act, but in literally every section of the 
statute.”  Id.; see also Sierra Club, 245 F.3d at 438 
(“[T]he objective of the ESA is to enable listed species 
not to merely survive, but to recover from their 
endangered of threatened status.” (emphasis added)). 
 
Consistent with the ESA’s recovery goals, this 
Court has affirmed the Secretary’s authority to 
interpret the general language of the statute to 
include habitat protection.  In Sweet Home, for 
example, the Court upheld the Secretary’s 
interpretation of “harm” in section 3 of the ESA as 
including “habitat modification.”  515 U.S. at 695.  In 
doing so, it rejected the lower court’s conclusion that 
the term harm “must refer to the direct application of 
force because the words around it do.”  Id. at 701.  The 
Court looked to the broad purposes of the Act to 
uphold the Secretary’s interpretation that the word 
harm should include indirect threats to species from 
habitat destruction.  Id.  The Court noted that the 
ESA is “the most comprehensive legislation for the 
preservation of endangered species ever enacted by 
any nation,” id. at 699 (quoting Hill, 437 U.S. at 180), 
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and that the 1973 enactment contained a “sweeping 
prohibition against the taking of endangered species.”  
Id.  The Court concluded: “Given Congress’ clear 
expression of the ESA’s broad purpose to protect 
endangered and threatened wildlife, the Secretary’s 
definition of ‘harm’ is reasonable.”  Id. at 700.  
 
Recognizing the “considerable breadth” with 
which this Court has treated the ESA’s terms, lower 
courts have declined to add words like “habitable” 
that would limit the Secretary’s authority to 
designate unoccupied habitat as essential to the 
conservation of a species.  See, e.g., Bear Valley Mut. 
Water Co. v. Jewell, 790 F.3d 977, 994 (9th Cir. 2015) 
(refusing to read “habitable” into provision allowing 
FWS to designate unoccupied land as critical habitat 
because doing so would contravene plain text of ESA, 
“which requires [FWS] to show the area is ‘essential’ 
without defining that term as ‘habitable’”); Ariz. 
Cattle Growers’ Ass’n v. Salazar, 606 F.3d 1160, 1166-
67 (9th Cir. 2010) (refusing to limit occupied habitat 
to areas where species actually reside because 
allowing FWS “to designate as occupied habitat where 
the species is likely to be found promotes the ESA’s 
conservation goals and comports with the ESA’s 
policy of institutionalized caution” (internal quotation 
marks omitted)); Sierra Club, 245 F.3d at 438 
(refusing to limit designations of unoccupied critical 
habitat to only endangered species because 
unoccupied critical habitat should be designated for 
both threatened and endangered species where it is 
necessary to achieve species recovery). 
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 Where, as in the case of the dusky gopher frog, 
the species’ conservation depends on land that, while 
not presently suitable, is the only viable option for 
bringing that species back from the brink of 
extinction, the Secretary must be able to designate it 
as critical habitat.  If the Secretary is unable to do so, 
the dusky gopher frog, and other species like it, will 
be limited to small patches of fragmented habitat 
with little or no chance for survival and eventual 
recovery.  
 
D. The legislative history of the ESA confirms 
the Secretary’s interpretation that critical 
habitat includes unoccupied areas that may 
require restoration. 
 
When Congress enacted the ESA in 1973, it did 
so to “widen the protection which can be provided to 
endangered species.”  H.R. Rep. No. 93-412 from the 
Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 
accompanying H.R. 37, at 1, reprinted in A Legislative 
History of the ESA at 140.  In 1973, and during 
subsequent amendments and reauthorizations of the 
ESA, a significant focus of these “widened” 
protections was critical habitat.  See, e.g., H.R. 37, at 
5 (1973), reprinted in A Legislative History of the ESA 
at 144 (“The protection of habitat of endangered 
species is clearly a critical function of any legislation 
in this area.”); 119 Cong. Rec. 25, 669 (1973), 
reprinted in A Legislative History of the ESA at 358 
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(finding land acquisition essential to success of ESA 
because “most endangered species are threatened 
primarily by the destruction of their natural 
habitats”); H.R. Rep. No. 94-887 (1976), reprinted in 
A Legislative History of the ESA at 497 (“[T]he 
ultimate effectiveness of the Endangered Species Act 
will depend on the designation of critical habitats.”); 
House Consideration & Passage of H.R. 8092 (1976), 
reprinted in A Legislative History of the ESA at 506 
(“The listing process is meaningless unless the 
Departments take the appropriate steps to protect 
species’ habitats.”). 
 
When Congress passed Senate Bill 2899 in 
1978, it expressly rejected proposed amendments that 
would have restricted the definition of unoccupied 
critical habitat.  Specifically, Congress considered and 
rejected two requirements: (1) that an unoccupied 
area be “one into which the species can be expected to 
expand naturally,” Senate Consideration & Passage 
of S. 2899, with amendments, Congressional Record, 
July 18, 1978, reprinted in A Legislative History of the 
ESA at 1065, and (2) that an unoccupied area be one 
that is “periodically inhabited by the species,” House 
Consideration & Passage of S. 2899, with 
amendment, in lieu of H. R. 14104, Congressional 
Record, Oct. 14, 1978, reprinted in A Legislative 
History of the ESA at 879.  In doing so, Congress 
signaled its intent to give the Secretary broad 
authority to designate unoccupied critical habitat 
limited only by the requirement that the areas be 
“essential for the conservation of the species” and not 
27 
 
 
 
by any temporal or habitability requirements.  16 
U.S.C. § 1532(5)(A)(ii); see Hill, 437 U.S. at 184 
(“Agencies in particular are directed by §§ 2(c) and 
3(2) of the Act to ‘use . . . all methods and procedures 
which are necessary’ to preserve endangered species.” 
(emphasis in original) (citations omitted)). 
 
 Petitioner’s reading of section 3(5)(A)(ii) would 
prohibit the Secretary from designating habitat 
deemed necessary for recovery by the best scientific 
data available merely because it does not currently—
but could in the future—support a population of 
dusky gopher frogs.  This contradicts the Act’s 
legislative history, which reveals that Congress 
rejected language that would have imposed temporal 
and habitability requirements restricting the 
Secretary’s broad authority to designate unoccupied 
critical habitat. 
 
II. Conservation of Unoccupied Habitat, 
Even If Suboptimal, Is Essential for 
Recovering Species Threatened by 
Climate Change.  
 
Scientists, legal professionals, and 
policymakers have recognized the world is changing 
at a sufficiently rapid pace due to climate change and 
that a static conservation policy cannot adequately 
respond to this change.  See Holly Doremus, The 
Endangered Species Act: Static Law Meets Dynamic 
World, 32 Wash. U. J.L. & Pol’y 175, 176 (2011).  
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Species’ range shifts and behavioral changes based on 
climate change impacts are well-documented.  
Camille Parmesan & Gary Yohe, A Globally Coherent 
Fingerprint of Climate Change Impacts Across 
Natural Systems, 421 Nature 37, 38–39 (2003).  
Rising temperatures are forcing many endangered 
and threatened species to migrate away from their 
home ranges.  See J.B. Ruhl, Climate Change and the 
Endangered Species Act, 88 B.U. L. Rev. 1, 22 (2008).  
Critical habitat designations must be able to respond 
to the increasing threats listed species face, and 
future listed species will face, as a result of climate 
change.  See Doremus, supra, at 215 (asserting that 
ESA should take into account often unstable course of 
nature). 
 
The Secretary addressed threats posed by 
climate change for dusky gopher frogs by designating 
sites at a sufficient distance from the frogs’ current 
occupied habitat to serve as refuges, if the sites 
presently occupied are “negatively affected by 
environmental threats or catastrophic events.”  Final 
Designation, 77 Fed. Reg. at 35,124.  Due to habitat 
fragmentation and the frogs’ “limited natural ability 
to move through the landscape,” the Secretary 
identified dusky gopher frogs as particularly 
“susceptible to the effects of rapid climate change” 
and determined that “[t]he designation of critical 
habitat, and the creation of new populations of dusky 
gopher frogs through reintroductions, should give the 
species better odds of survival and recovery given the 
threats posed by climate change.”  Id.  Thus, the 
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Secretary exercised his authority to designate 
unoccupied critical habitat to protect and recover this 
imperiled species.  Without the ability to designate 
unoccupied, presently unsuitable areas as critical, the 
Secretary would lack the tools to protect sufficient 
habitat for the recovery of dusky gopher frogs and 
similarly imperiled species. 
 
III. The Secretary’s Decision Not to 
Exclude an Area from Critical Habitat 
Designation Is Judicially 
Unreviewable. 
 
Although the Administrative Procedure Act 
(APA) embodies a “basic presumption of judicial 
review,” Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 140 
(1967), abrogated on other grounds by Califano v. 
Sanders, 430 U.S. 99 (1977), section 701(a)(2) of the 
APA “bars judicial review of agency action when the 
matter in dispute has been ‘committed to agency 
discretion by law,’” Drake v. F.A.A., 291 F.3d 59, 70 
(D.C. Cir. 2002) (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2)).  This 
“very narrow exception,” Citizens to Pres. Overton 
Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 410 (1971), 
abrogated on other grounds by Califano v. Sanders, 
430 U.S. 99 (1977), applies where the statute provides 
“no judicially manageable standards . . . for judging 
how and when an agency should exercise its 
discretion,” Heckler, 470 U.S. at 830; see also Overton 
Park, 401 U.S. at 410 (holding that an action is 
committed to agency discretion by law “where 
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statutes are drawn in such broad terms that in a 
given case there is no law to apply” (citation omitted)).  
 
A. Section 4(b)(2) establishes no “judicially 
manageable standards” by which to judge the 
Secretary’s discretionary decision not to 
exclude an area from critical habitat 
designation. 
 
A plain reading of section 4(b)(2) shows that, 
while a decision to exclude an area from designation 
is reviewable, a decision not to exclude is not.  See 
Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 600 (1988) (looking first 
to the language of the provision at issue to determine 
whether a judicially manageable standard existed).  
The first sentence of section 4(b)(2) provides that 
“[t]he Secretary shall designate critical habitat . . . on 
the basis of the best scientific data available and after 
taking into consideration the economic impact, the 
impact on national security, and any other relevant 
impact, of specifying any particular area as critical 
habitat.”  16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(2) (emphasis added).  
The second sentence states that  
 
[t]he Secretary may exclude any area from 
critical habitat if he determines that the 
benefits of such exclusion outweigh the 
benefits of specifying such area as part of 
the critical habitat, unless he determines, 
based on the best scientific and 
commercial data available, that the failure 
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to designate such area as critical habitat 
will result in the extinction of the species 
concerned. 
 
Id. (emphasis added). 
 
Congress articulated judicially manageable 
standards in the second sentence of section 4(b)(2) by 
conveying that the Secretary has the discretion to 
exclude areas from designation after following the 
statute’s specified process.  See Pet. App. 34a–35a.  
The second sentence prohibits exclusion in certain 
circumstances: if the Secretary determines that the 
benefits of exclusion do not outweigh the benefits of 
inclusion, or if extinction would result from exclusion.  
See Bldg. Indus. Ass’n of the Bay Area v. U.S. Dep’t of 
Commerce, 792 F.3d 1027, 1033 (9th Cir. 2015) (“The 
term ‘outweigh’ in the second sentence limits the 
agency’s discretion to exclude areas from 
designation.”).  Because the statute bars the 
Secretary from excluding areas in these defined 
instances, secretarial decisions to exclude areas from 
designation are reviewable. 
 
Moreover, a decision to exclude “otherwise 
essential habitat is . . . properly reviewable because it 
is equivalent to a decision not to designate critical 
habitat”—an action that section 4(b)(2) obligates the 
Secretary to take.  Bear Valley Mut. Water Co., 790 
F.3d at 990. 
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In contrast, section 4(b)(2) does not articulate 
any judicially manageable standards “governing 
when the [Secretary] must exclude an area from 
designation.”  Pet. App. 35a (emphasis in original).  
The permissive language of the second sentence of 
section 4(b)(2) gives the Secretary the discretion to 
prioritize conservation when making an exclusion 
decision.   
 
Even if the Secretary determined that the 
economic benefits of exclusion did outweigh the 
benefits of inclusion, the statute would not obligate 
the agency to exclude the area.  See 16 U.S.C. 
§ 1533(b)(2); cf. Amy Sinden, The Economics of 
Endangered Species: Why Less Is More in the 
Economic Analysis of Critical Habitat Designations, 
28 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 129, 196 (2004) (“Rather than 
mandating an approach that would ensure that 
critical habitat was never designated when economic 
costs outweighed benefits, Congress sought only to 
give the Secretary the flexibility to deviate from a 
purely biological approach when she deemed it 
appropriate.”).  Under no circumstances does the 
second sentence obligate the Secretary to exclude an 
area from designation.6  See Pet. App. 34a–35a; see 
                                                 
6 Additionally, as the Ninth and Fifth Circuits have recognized, 
the agency has the discretion to choose its methodology when 
making decisions pursuant to section 4(b)(2).  See Bldg. Indus. 
Ass’n, 792 F.3d at 1032–33 (“[A]fter the agency considers 
economic impact, the entire exclusionary process is discretionary 
and there is no particular methodology that the agency must 
follow”); Pet. App. 36a (“[Section 4(b)(2)] does not require a 
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also Bear Valley Mut. Water Co., 790 F.3d at 990.  The 
ESA’s “broad purpose to protect endangered and 
threatened wildlife” supports this plain reading of 
section 4(b)(2).  See Sweet Home, 515 U.S. at 700; see 
also supra Sections I.B.–C. (discussing the ESA’s 
objectives and broad remedial purpose). 
 
This Court and lower courts have found that 
similar provisions in other statutes fail to articulate 
judicially manageable standards.  See, e.g., Webster, 
486 U.S. at 594, 600 (holding that section 102(c) of the 
National Security Act of 1947, which provides that the 
director of Central Intelligence can terminate 
employees “whenever he shall deem such termination 
necessary or advisable in the interests of the United 
States,” “foreclose[d] the application of any 
meaningful judicial standard of review”); Baltimore 
Gas & Elec. Co. v. Fed. Energy Reg. Comm’n, 252 F.3d 
456, 461 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (holding that section 717 of 
the Natural Gas Act, providing that the Federal 
Energy Regulatory Commission “may in its discretion 
bring an action” against a violator, provided no 
                                                 
particular methodology for considering economic impact.”); 
Kalyani Robbins, Recovery of an Endangered Provision: 
Untangling and Reviving Critical Habitat Under the 
Endangered Species Act, 58 Buff. L. Rev. 1095, 1111 (2010) 
(“Congress did not mandate an actual cost-benefit analysis for 
designating critical habitat—rather, it allowed the agencies to 
‘take into account’ economic impacts, which is quite different, 
and does not lend itself to striking down designations for 
inadequate consideration of economic impacts.” (footnotes 
omitted)). 
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judicially manageable standards to review the 
agency’s decision to settle an enforcement agreement); 
Sierra Club v. Larson, 882 F.2d 128, 129, 132 (4th Cir. 
1989) (holding that section 131 of the Highway 
Beautification Act, requiring that states exercise 
“effective control” over outdoor advertising, provided 
“no law to apply” to the Federal Highway 
Administration’s decision not to institute 
enforcement proceedings).  
 
The only circuit courts to address this issue 
have held that the decision not to exclude an area 
from critical habitat designation is unreviewable.  See 
Pet. App. 34a–35a; Bear Valley Mut. Water Co., 790 
F.3d at 990.  District courts have reached the same 
conclusion.  See Aina Nui Corp. v. Jewell, 52 F. Supp. 
3d 1110, 1132 n.4 (D. Haw. 2014) (holding the 
Secretary’s “ultimate decision not to exclude [an area] 
from designation” was committed to agency 
discretion); Cape Hatteras Access Pres. Alliance v. U.S. 
Dep’t of the Interior, 731 F. Supp. 2d 15, 29 (D.D.C. 
2010) (finding the Secretary’s decision not to exclude 
is unreviewable under the APA because “the plain 
reading of the statute fails to provide a standard by 
which to judge the . . . decision”); Home Builders Ass’n 
of N. Cal. v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., No. CIV. S-05-
0629 WBS-GGH, 2006 WL 3190518, at *20 (E.D. Cal. 
Nov. 2, 2006) (“[T]he court has no substantive 
standards by which to review the [Secretary’s] 
decisions not to exclude certain tracts based on 
economic or other considerations, and those decisions 
are therefore committed to agency discretion.”), 
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opinion modified on other grounds on 
reconsideration, No. CIV. S-05-0629 WBS-GGH, 2007 
WL 201248 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 24, 2007).  But see Wyo. 
State Snowmobile Ass’n. v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 
741 F. Supp. 2d 1245, 1248 (D. Wyo. 2010). 
 
B. Bennett v. Spear is inapposite. 
 
 In Bennett v. Spear, the question was whether 
the petitioners could seek judicial review under the 
ESA’s citizen-suit provision.  520 U.S. 154, 157 (1997).  
The Bennett petitioners claimed that the Secretary 
made an implicit critical habitat designation for an 
endangered fish by issuing a Biological Opinion under 
section 7(b) of the ESA without first considering the 
purported designation’s economic impact under 
section 4(b)(2).  Id. at 160.  The government contended 
that the petitioners could not pursue this claim under 
the citizen-suit provision, which authorizes citizen 
suits when the Secretary fails to perform “any act or 
duty” under the ESA “which is not discretionary.”  Id. 
at 171–72 (citing 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g)(1)(C)).  The 
Supreme Court held that the petitioners could seek 
judicial review under the citizen-suit provision 
because section 4(b)(2) requires the Secretary to 
consider the economic impacts before designating 
critical habitat.  Id. at 172.  The Court thus allowed 
the petitioners to proceed on their claim that the 
Secretary failed to satisfy a procedural requirement.  
Id. at 178.  
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In Bennett, the Secretary did not make an 
exclusion decision under section 4(b)(2), and the 
parties never briefed—nor did the Court address—
whether a decision not to exclude an area from 
designation is separately reviewable. Thus, 
Petitioner’s reliance on the obiter dictum that the 
“Secretary’s ultimate decision [to designate critical 
habitat] is reviewable only for abuse of discretion,” id. 
at 172, is inapposite.  See Central Va. Cmty. Coll. v. 
Katz, 546 U.S. 356, 363 (2006) (“[W]e are not bound to 
follow our dicta in a prior case in which the point now 
at issue was not fully debated.”). 
 
Further, unlike in this case, the Bennett 
petitioners alleged that the Secretary did not adhere 
to section 4(b)(2)’s procedural requirements when he 
failed to consider the economic impacts of a purported 
implicit critical habitat designation.  Bennett, 520 U.S. 
at 160, 172.  The Bennett Court stated that “[i]t is 
rudimentary administrative law that discretion as to 
the substance of the ultimate decision does not confer 
discretion to ignore the required procedures of 
decisionmaking.”  Id. at 172.  Here, there is no 
question that the Secretary followed the required 
procedural step of considering economic impact when 
he designated critical habitat for the dusky gopher 
frog under the first sentence of section 4(b)(2).  Rather, 
Petitioner argues that the Secretary’s failure to 
exclude Unit 1 from the ultimate critical habitat 
designation was incorrect.  However, as set forth 
above, see supra Section III.A., the Secretary’s 
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decision not to exclude an area from designation is 
unreviewable.   
CONCLUSION 
 
The judgment of the court of appeals should be 
affirmed. 
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